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Regrettably, this attitude is manifested also in other cases. In U.S. v.
Enger58 the Department of Justice argued that the Vienna Convention was
not self-executing, a view that was wisely rejected by the court 9 and was
obviously inconsistent with the approach taken by the Diplomatic Relations
Act.60 Recent case law reveals a certain hostility of the courts to the domestic
applicability of customary international law or treaties.6' The purpose of this
comment is to call attention to this regrettable and unsalutary trend.
STEFAN A. RIESENFELD
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF VETOED RESOLUTIONS
On December 31, 1979, the United Nations Security Council, at the initia-
tive of the United States, adopted Resolution 461. It deplored the continued
detention of the U.S. hostages in Iran and called on the Government of the
Islamic Republic to secure their release. Operative paragraph 6 of the
resolution stated that the Council would meet on January 7, 1980, "in order
to review the situation and, in the event of non-compliance with this resolu-
tion, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter
of the United Nations."' As the hostages had not been released, the United
States on January 10, 1980, submitted draft resolution S/13735 to the Secu-
rity Council detailing a sanctions program against Iran. 2 The question was
called on January 13. Ten members voted for the resolution, whereupon
it was vetoed by the Soviet Union.3
After the veto, Donald McHenry, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
told the Council that
under resolution 461 (1979) the Council undertook a binding obligation
to adopt effective measures and under Article 25 of the Charter all
Member States are obliged to respect the provisions of resolution 461
(1979). The Soviet veto now attempts to block the membership from
fulfilling that obligation. The question then arises what a member bound
by resolution 461 (1979) and acting in good faith pursuant to its obliga-
tions under Article 2 (2) of the Charter, should do to implement that
resolution.
without having sought or urging that advice be sought from the Department of State as to the
foreign policy implications of such a position; Brief for the United States in Docket No.
78-1714.
58472 F.Supp. 490 (D.N.J. 1978). .591d. at 542.
w 92 Stat. 808 (1978). The act formally repealed certain statutes superseded by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and provided, inter alia, for the dismissal of any action or
proceeding against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or
proceeding under the Vienna Convention; §§3(a) and 5.
61 See, e.g., Dreyfuss v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (customary international law);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (treaty provisions);
Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 430 F.Supp. 1168, 1172 (D.D.C. 1977) (treaty
violation). For a praiseworthy contrast, see the recentjudgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala ofJune 30, 1980,49 U.S.L.W. 2039 (1980), reprinted
in 19 ILM 966 (1980).
1 Resolution 461 (1979), adopted by the Security Council at its 2184th meetin g, Dec. 31, 1979,
reprinted in 19 ILM 250 (1980).
2 UN Doc. S/13735 (Jan. 10, 1980). See also UN Doc. S/PV.2191, at 2 (Jan. 11, 1980).
3 UN Doc. S/PV.2191/Add.1, at 54-55 (Jan. 13, 1980).
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. . . the membership of the United Nations at large remains obligated
to review the situation and the event of Iran's non-compliance with it,
an event that has come to pass, and to take effective measures consistent
with the Charter to implement that resolution.4
That view was not universally held. The Soviet Union responded in the
strongest terms.5 Chen Chu of China recalled, in more moderate tones,
that his Government had voted for Resolution 461 (1979) but had been
rather reserved, at the time, about any subsequent automatic adoption of
measures in accordance with its operative paragraph 6.6 Now, some 2 weeks
later, he felt that sanctions would not contribute to a resolution of the
situation.7 Hence China's abstention.
Thus it appeared that S/13735, like other vetoed Security Council resolu-
tions, was dead. In fact, reports of its death proved greatly exaggerated.
On April 7, 1980, President Carter announced, coincidently with the
termination of diplomatic relations with Iran, the initiation of a number of
programs against Iran and Iranian nationals.8 With respect to economic
sanctions, Mr. Carter associated himself with S/13735, in part, it would seem,
to gain added authority for his action. The President said: "[T]he Secretary
of the Treasury will put into effect official sanctions prohibiting exports
from the United States to Iran, in accordance with the sanctions approved
by 10 members of the United Nations Security Council on January 13 in the
resolution which was vetoed by the Soviet Union."* Even more explicit in
its use of the vetoed Council resolution was the resolution of the European
Common Market Foreign Ministers (ECMFM) adopted on April 22, 1980.10
Paragraph 5 of the dispatch provided, in relevant part:
The Foreign Ministers of the Nine, deeply concerned that a continua-
tion of this situation may endanger international peace and security,
have decided to request their national Parliaments immediately to take
any necessary measures to impose sanctions against Iran in accordance
with the Security Council resolution on Iran of 10 January 1980, which
was vetoed, and in accordance with the rules of international law.
ECMFM's citation of the vetoed Security Council resolution, like Presi-
dent Carter's, may be construed in one sense as no more than an incorpora-
tion by reference of the factual program envisaged in the ill-fated resolution.
But the ECMFM paragraph also implies that the vetoed resolution is, with
"the rules of international law," a coequal basis for the contemplated sanc-
tions program. If the Ministers' view was that a Security Council resolution
was not needed for the initiation of trade and other export controls by one
or more states against another state engaged in a serious and continuing
violation of international law, then the reference to the vetoed resolution
was gratuitous and confusing. If their view was that the Charter and inter-
4Id. at 61. 51d. at 61-62.
"UN Doc. S/PV.2184, at 11 (1979). 7 UN Doc. SIPV.2191/Add.1, at 56 (1980).
" Sanctions Against Iran: Remarks Announcing U.S. Actions, April 7, 1980, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 611 (Apr. 14, 1980).
"Ibid.
"' New York Times, April 23, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
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national law require Council authorization for such sanctions, the invocation
of a vetoed resolution may have had more significant legal implications.
President Carter's language was more cautious than ECMFM's. Though
perhaps intended to do no more than gild his decision, it too seemed
to imply that an action, otherwise unlawful, might acquire a certain lawful-
ness because ten states voted for it in the Security Council. There are, in
short, a number of indications suggesting that the customary processes of
international law are beginning to install, at the international constitutive
level, a new modality of Security Council lawmaking. We might refer to it
as the "majoritarian" system, for it tends to transpose the majority decision
dynamics of the General Assembly to the Security Council, ignoring the
veto, and ascribing prescriptive and authorizing power to proposals sup-
ported by a majority in the Council but formally ineffective. A. consideration
and appraisal of the political and legal implications of the innovation would
appear urgent.
In general, a proposal that has almost been accepted under the rules of
the arena in which it was lodged has no legal effect itself, though it may
contribute to the consolidation of a customary norm. Whether it has fallen
just short of a majority or been virtually unanimous and then vetoed, it
has, under the rules of the arena in which it was forwarded, rio prescriptive
force. After rejection, it is no longer called a "resolution," but is referred to
as a "draft" or "projet." Yet because of the many ambiguities in the ethics
of organized democracy, proponents who have lost on an issue sparking
violent emotions may often feel that there is something inherently unjust in
the way the decision procedure worked. This feeling of dissatisfaction will
be even stronger when the rules of the arena allow a liberum veto, for then
it is possible that a nearly unanimous expression will be negated by a single
actor. Displeasure notwithstanding, if the arena rules continue to express the
common interests of most of the politically relevant actors, no one will insist
that a democratic "spirit" overrides a procedural "letter" and that the pro-
posal has actually passed and become law. Indeed, where one of the functions
of the veto is to maintain ongoing coordination between the outcomes of the
formal arena and processes of effective power, acknowledgement of the
lawfulness of the veto, as distasteful as it may be in the particular case,
may be necessary for the formal arena's ongoing viability, if not existence.
In the United Nations, the institution of the veto in the Security Council
was created as a genetic feature. Charter Article 27 limits decision by major-
ity to procedural matters. "Decisions of the Security Council on all other
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including
the concurring votes of the permanent members." Like Article 5 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, this regime expressed a conception of
the inexorable relations between authority and control and a shared feeling
about the indispensability of great power consensus both for the effective-
ness of individual decisions as well as for the continuing viability of the
Organization. The innovation of a majoritarian system as a customary re-
vision of the Charter with regard to Security Council lawmaking is radical
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and can be expected to be acceptable only if the features and dynamics of
the effective power process have changed.
It is understandable that states denied the veto privilege in an organized
arena should chafe at their disability and seek to minimize its legal effect.
But it is, to say the least, surprising to find states with the veto consciously
undertaking to minimize its effect in order to achieve short-term and quite
transient objectives. It is especially disconcerting when the denigration of the
veto is not necessary to achieve those ends.
When wielded by adversaries, the veto has worked against the United
States. But in a curious way it may have preserved the United Nations by
allowing or forcing it to yield to reality. As the relative influence of the
United States in the General Assembly has waned, the veto has increasingly
served American interests. Indeed, it may now contribute to the ability of
the United States to continue to be an active supporter of the Organization.
Departures from the veto regime, such as the General Assembly's "Uniting
For Peace" Resolution" (an American initiative), in retrospect are viewed
by many in the foreign affairs establishment with very mixed feelings.
Obviously, none of the permanent members of the Security Council is
about to surrender the veto. But careless language can erode its effec-
tiveness. Some stand to gain much more than others by the addition of a
Security Council majoritarian system that ascribes some legal power to im-
portant questions even after they have been vetoed. The United States and
Western Europe might well pause and reflect on the long-term constitu-
tional and political implications of installing a majoritarian system in the
Security Council before the), endorse a revision which may prove irreversible.
W. MICHAEL REISMAN:'
THE CASE OF THE NONPERMANENT VACANCY
Five states are permanent members of the United Nations Security Coun-
cil.' Ten others, characterized in Charter Article 23 as "non-permanent
members,"" are elected by the General Assembly for a term of 2 years; no
nonpermanent member may be immediately reelected.' Under Rule 144 of
the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, five nonpermanent members are elected
each year.4 Under Rule 85, election of nonpermanent members is an "im-
portant question" requiring a two-thirds majority of Assembly members
11 GA Res. 377A (V), Nov. 3, 1950,5 GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 10-12.
* This comment draws on work done under a grant from the National Science Foundation.
Helpful comments by my colleague, Myres S. McDougal, are gratefully acknowledged.
United Nations Charter Article 23(1). Permanent members designated in that provision
are the "'Republic of China," France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
'Article 23(1) establishes qualitative criteria to guide the Assembly in the election of the
nonpermanent members, the most politically significant being that of geographical distribution.
In 1963, Article 23 was amended to expand the number of nonpermanent members from 6
to 11. S, znfra.
'Charter Article 23(2).
' UNITED N ,TIONS, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1972).
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